The Unmaking of Iraq, Part Three: The Best Intentions

"This is a period in which it gets harder before it gets easier." - General David Petraeus

Obama: Wait, we still aren't done here?

By 2004, the brewing tensions against the American occupation in Iraq had exploded into a brutal insurgency.  With Iraq's military disbanded, and many of its former members contributing to the insurgency itself, it was up to the coalition forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority (the temporary governing body of Iraq) to rebuild the nation it had just torn down.  As we've seen in part two of this series, the CPA made a number of serious mistakes in the first few months of the occupation which directly (though inadvertently) helped create the insurgency.  But not everything the CPA and the military did was counterproductive.  In this final installment of the series on Iraq, we'll discuss the ways the United States helped rebuild the country, and will take a look at the final connections between the war in Iraq and the rise of the so-called "Islamic State."

As the insurgency gained steam throughout 2004 and 2005, the American strategy finally began to shift towards counterinsurgency practices. The policy of "winning hearts and minds" was adopted to help learn from the initial mistakes of the invasion (specifically not taking the support of the Iraqi people for granted).  Billions of dollars were also spent on reconstruction programs designed to educate, empower, and employ the hundreds of thousands of people who were negatively affected by the initial invasion.  Though some of these programs proved completely pointless for the rebuilding effort, many of them also helped stabilize the country and give the Iraqi people a reason to support the American military.

But still, the insurgency raged on.  In 2006, the coalition forces began a deliberate campaign to recruit Sunni tribal leaders to work with the American forces in fighting the al-Qaeda affiliated Sunni fighters.  Known as the Anbar Awakening (for the Anbar province of Iraq where the majority of these Sunni fighters live), this strategy helped empower Iraqis to win back their country from extremism and likely prevented significant numbers of Sunni fighters from being recruited into the insurgency.  Though Iraq's Sunni population would continue to take issue with the predominantly Shia government elected under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the support of Anbar greatly contributed to the temporary stability of the country. 

Above: Maliki counting to four

However, 2006 also saw the outbreak of a disastrous civil war in Iraq.  A faction of the Sunni insurgency fighters bombed a prominent Shia mosque in February in an attempt to provoke Iraq's Shia population into fighting the Sunni population.  With the support of the Anbar forces and the surge of American troops in 2007, the country narrowly avoided splitting apart entirely along religious lines.  Still, reconstruction and tactical victories against the insurgent forces (and several setbacks) would continue for several years.  The final official American soldiers left Iraq in December of 2011, officially handing over the remaining security operations to the Iraqi forces.  Though peace was uneasy in the country, it seemed to many like Iraq could finally begin stand on its own again.  In hindsight, it is clear that American forces disconnected from Iraq before the country was capable of handling its own security.  In many ways, this decision spanned both Bush and Obama administrations and came about in part as a desire to hasten the end of the war due to its increasing unpopularity among the American public (and very large price tag).  Many experts predicted the problems Iraq would end up facing in recent years.

Biden: So you got this now, right?

The aftereffects of the Arab Spring (not to mention the continued religious tensions) would again plunge Iraq into chaos.  These protests against authoritarian government in Tunisia in 2011 inspired similar protests in Egypt and Syria against the leaders of those nations.  While Egypt's transition was relatively peaceful (President Hosni Mubarak willingly left office), Syria's President Bashar al-Assad began a brutal campaign of oppression which sparked an equally brutal civil war in Syria.  In the chaos of this war, radical religious fighters (many of whom had joined the Iraqi insurgency years earlier) joined together to form the group now calling itself ISIS (also referred to as the Islamic State and ISIL).  The combination of Iraq's poorly defended borders, the weak central government and army, and continued Sunni tensions in Iraq's western Anbar province made it easy for ISIS to surge through parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014 to control large sections of the two countries.  Now in 2015, ISIS fighters remain firmly entrenched in their positions, with no clear end in sight.

So what happens now?  Some presidential candidates are considering the possibility of invading Iraq again to take down ISIS, but this would likely cause the same problems as before (insurgency, sectarian violence, resentment of American influence in the region).  Or, we can take a lesson from the Anbar Awakening and continue to aid our allies (Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia alike) in the region to build trust throughout the country and conduct proper counterinsurgency operations.  Like any meaningful solution, this will take significant time and resources.  However, helping the Iraqi people help themselves will produce far better results than continuing to insist that the American military can solve all of the problems of the world.

Looking back, we come to the final question of this three part series: Was it worth it?  Saddam Hussein's massive stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction were never found (at least not in significant numbers).  Contrary the the neo-conservative ideology, democracy and peace did not spread throughout the region (and the democratic Arab Spring actually seems to have made things worse).  Hussein and his terrible regime are gone, but the replacement government is hardly equipped to deal with ISIS on its own.  And even if there had been stockpiles of WMDs, would that justify the lack of any initial strategy for governance following the invasion?  It is impossible to speculate on how Iraq would like today had Hussein not been removed.  Were he still in power during the Arab Spring, perhaps his response would have been similar to that of Assad, massacring his own people to keep himself in power.  In any case, such counterfactual questions are meaningless when looking at the reality of today's Iraq.

Not that ISIS....

In all, the years of violence in Iraq contributed to the deaths of nearly 5,000 coalition forces, 20,000 Iraqi security forces, 37,000 Iraqi army and insurgent fighters, and somewhere between 110,000-120,000 Iraqi civilians.  Of course, it would be extremely unfair to attribute all of these to the coalition (one of the hallmarks of the insurgency was its use of violence against the Iraqi population itself).  But hopefully, the lessons learned from the invasion of Iraq will remind the American public (and military officials especially) of the dangerous and unpredictable nature of warfare.  As terrible as it is, there are indeed some situations in which the only viable solution  to an international dispute is war.  Hitler and Nazis weren't going to stop their conquest of Europe through kind words or pointy sticks.  But it should only be considered as a last result, when all other options have been exhausted.  War is a Pandora's box that rarely works out exactly as planned.  Even under the best planned situations, there are often many unexpected surprises.  Though cliched, the saying "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it" is very appropriate here.  Let us never forget the lessons of Iraq.  The decision to go to war (though sometimes necessary) should never be taken lightly.

Tl:DR: The war in Iraq is far too important to reduce to just a sentence (or even a series of blog posts).  Read the whole series and then go educate yourself!

The Unmaking of Iraq, Part 2: All The Wrong Choices

"I can't tell you if the use of force in Iraq today will last five days, five weeks or five months, but it won't last any longer than that."--Donald Rumsfeld in 2002

So we're done now right?

On March 20th, 2003, the American and British armies surged across the border into Iraq, hoping to overthrow the rule of Saddam Hussein and destroy his alleged stockpile of dangerous weapons.  The final decision to go to war involved a combination of factors at the highest levels of the Bush administration, most of which have been detailed in part one this series.  When the invasion commenced, nearly every senior administration official was convinced that Hussein's army would break quickly, that the Americans would be welcomed as liberators, and that power would transfer quickly and easily from the the victorious American forces to an Iraqi governing body.  Looking back, these assertions seem incredibly short-sighted.  In part two of this series on the making of modern Iraq, we take a good look at the critical mistakes the American administration made during the first few months after the invasion.  Ultimately, these mistakes directly contributed to the creation of a powerful insurgency within the country. 

Yup, we're done here.  Good work team!

President Bush and his main advisers were half-right about Iraq.  By May 1st, the Iraqi army had been completely defeated (at least in a conventional military sense) and many Iraqis (but certainly not all) were optimistic for the future.  However, the mood quickly soured between the Americans and Iraqis as the presence of foreign forces endured long after Baghdad had fallen.  Perhaps the single greatest factor which contributed to the problems the United States would face in Iraq was the lack of strategic planning for the future of Iraq once the U.S. claimed victory.  The military's command structure was plagued by disorganization and the lack of a coherent strategy.  The war planning process had placed all of its attention on winning the war, with little concern for securing the peace afterwards.  All of this meant that instead of quickly building up a governing coalition by securing the trust and cooperation of prominent tribal leaders, the military's lack of strong direction allowed regime supporters and opportunistic rebels to build up their own forces.  But this aimless policy alone wasn't necessarily enough to create a vicious insurgency.  For that, it would take three very large mistakes in the American administration of post-invasion Iraq.

Ten years later, Iraq had racked up nearly two trillion dollars in expenses

By mid-May, it was starting to become clear that the occupation of Iraq would take a little longer than a few short weeks.  On May 9th, President Bush appointed former ambassador Paul Bremer to be the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (basically the replacement government for Iraq until full elections could be held).  On his first day in office, Bremer and the CPA purged the Iraqi government and administration of almost all members of the Ba'ath party (Hussein's political party and the only legal party in Iraq previously).  Like the policy of de-Nazification before it (which tried to rid postwar Germany of all of its former Nazis), this policy banned the vast majority of the country's civil officials from participating in government or administrative services.  At first, this seems like a great way to remove all traces of Hussein's influence in Iraq.  But the problem with this policy (aside from being very indiscriminate regarding who it affects) is that in a single-party country like Iraq anyone who knows how to do anything is a Ba'ath party member!   Suddenly, upwards of 100,000 of Iraq's most competent people were kicked out of their old jobs, leaving new and often inexperienced replacements to pick up the pieces.  While there were certainly a large number of terrible people in these positions (who probably deserved a lot worse than just losing their jobs), their usefulness in keeping the country from falling apart far outweighs the need to seek vengeance on every member of Hussein's political party.  

NOT the Ba'ath party

Bremer's next move would prove at least as important (if not more so) in starting the insurgency. A few days after expelling the Ba'ath party from Iraq, the CPA ordered the complete dissolution of the entire Iraqi military.  Once again, this may seem like the obvious decision during a war, but it is important to remember that the army had essentially ceased combat operations already.  Most soldiers had returned to their homes or military bases to await further instruction from the American forces.  With the army disbanded, over 400,000 people (nearly all young men of combat age) were suddenly unemployed and humiliated.  Previously, there had been several post-invasion proposals which included using the Iraqi army for critical tasks such as infrastructure reconstruction and security.  Not only would this plan have freed up the American military to conduct other affairs, but the Iraqis also would have felt a personal stake in rebuilding their own country.  Instead, these tasks were delegated to the overworked and understaffed American soldiers.  To make matters worse, the military was one of the only unifying forces in Iraq which helped transcend ethnic and religious differences.  These were the individuals who knew the country, understood its cultural nuances, and had personal connections to the powerful people of Iraq.  Instead of utilizing this knowledge and these relationships, the CPA drove many of them right into the arms of insurgent forces waiting to capitalize on their disaffection. 

Bush: You're Fired!

Finally, the last major mistake in the initial months following the invasion was the decision to create a free market economy in Iraq at the expense of the already existing institutions and factories.  This caused some major industrial centers to close and further increased unemployment (especially among the middle class), destabilizing an already shaky Iraqi economy.  The free market economy, much like democracy, usually takes a long history of experience before it can become truly viable in a country.  This sort of change does not easily take hold overnight.  In all of these decisions, the CPA proved short-sighted and idealistic in its handling of post-invasion Iraq.  Rather than incrementally reform Iraq into a more stable and peaceful nation using its existing institutions, they chose to fundamentally change Iraqi society, with disastrous results.

From the very beginning of the conflict, the initial emphasis of the military was focused too heavily on finding Hussein and his alleged WMDs rather than the more pressing concern of nation building.  To date, only a handful of chemical weapons (and no nuclear or biological weapons) have ever been found (and even these were developed long before Iraq abandoned its weapons program in the 1990s).  The initial invasion force was just big enough to defeat the Iraqi army, but much too small to actually secure the country.  In essence, we were fighting the battle we wanted to fight, not that one that was actually being fought.  By the time the United States issued a clear and direct plan for the long-term stability of Iraq in late 2003, it was far too late.  The insurgency had begun.

Division of Iraq by September 2003

In all, the difficulties of the first several years in Iraq were due in many ways to extremely poor strategic planning, several decisions which contradicted basic counterinsurgency models, and a mindset which ignored the growing insurgent problem for several months.  Had the United States planned and executed a meaningful strategy of post-invasion stability, rebuilding, and power transfer, Iraq might have escaped the chaos and destruction of the following decade.  This isn't to say that Iraq would be the shining example of a successful military overthrow by a foreign power, but it's possible the United States could have left Iraq in better shape than when it first arrived.  Clearly, the troubles of the current Iraqi government demonstrate that this still isn't the case.  On the final post in this series, we'll try to understand how the insurgency helped give rise to the region's greatest threat: ISIS.

Tl;DR: The United States had almost no plan in place for post-invasion Iraq once it achieved victory.  Because of this, a series of bad decisions were made which created the perfect conditions for a long insurgency in Iraq.

The Unmaking Of Iraq, Part 1: The March To War

"Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction."--Dick Cheney in 2002

Former evil overlord of Iraq Saddam Hussein

One year ago, the United States formally began its operations to combat the fighters of ISIS.  Over these past twelve months, little substantial progress has been made to remove ISIS from its positions in Iraq and Syria.  Though northern and western Iraq have seen particularly difficult times, Iraq itself has been mired in violence and instability ever since the U.S. invasion in 2003 (and even before that in many places).  In the first of a three part series, we will examine the reasons for the invasion of Iraq, the subsequent mishandling of the initial occupation, and how all of this has helped created the modern problem of ISIS.  But first, let's uncover the driving forces behind the initial invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

So why did the United States (and a small coalition of other nations) invade Iraq?  Contrary to some popular beliefs, George W. Bush didn't invade Iraq because of a failed assassination attempt against his father.  Iraq's oil wealth also wasn't the primary motivator for the invasion (though it probably played a factor on some level).  The primary motivating factor for the invasion of Iraq (according to public statements and private interviews of senior intelligence officials) was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in order to prevent his regime from attaining weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) and to install a peaceful (read: U.S. friendly) and democratic government in Iraq.  There is a lot more to this, so let's rewind to the First Gulf War, where a major shift in U.S.-Iraqi relations occurred. 

The first invasion of Iraq....and Kuwait too

In 1990, Saddam Hussein's nation had become nearly bankrupt from almost a decade of fighting Iran in the Iran-Iraq War (which was a catastrophically destructive war for both nations).  In response to his country's problems, he decided to annex the small and oil rich nation of Kuwait to demonstrate his military power and seize some new petroleum assets for his country.  A few months later in early 1991, the United States (along with a large coalition of European and Gulf nations) drove the Iraqi army out of Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm.  When the dust finally settled from this fight, the Iraqi army had been pushed back into its own territory and relations between the U.S. and Iraq had become extremely hostile and distrusting (America actually supported Hussein previously in the Iran-Iraq war).  Rather than remove Hussein entirely, the United States began a policy of containing Iraq and preventing the slaughter of ethnic Kurds (a minority group in the north) and the Shia (rival religious group in the south) by enforcing a no-fly zone for Iraqi warplanes. 

This is essentially the policy which would continue until 2003.  Hussein had been beaten and his regime weakened even further, but for the most part he continued to maintain his aggressive stance against his primary regional rival Iran.  However within Washington, U.S. intelligence officials continued to operate under the mindset of long-term hostility towards Iraq.  This meant that many actions which would seem benign from an ally (such as the purchase of aluminum tubes) were viewed as clear indications of Iraq's nuclear ambitions.  To make matters worse, Hussein encouraged the continued myth of his own WMD program in order to intimidate Iran and prevent that nation from reigniting another Iran-Iraq war.  In reality, Hussein had mostly given up his nuclear ambitions, while his few remaining chemical weapons stockpiles (leftover from the Iran-Iraq war) were destroyed in the American-led Operation Desert Fox.

Places Hussein could bomb his people in the 1990s

To make matters worse from an intelligence standpoint, Hussein uncovered a covert plot to overthrow his rule.  In the process, he found a vast network of American collaborators and informants within his country and killed or exiled them.  What resulted from this was essentially an information blackout.  The U.S. government had almost no idea what was really going on within Iraq's borders, making it that much easier to misinterpret Iraq's intentions.  Still, the campaign of containment continued on....until September 11th.

The 9-11 attacks were a massive embarrassment to the intelligence community, and intelligence officials were determined to not let another tragedy like that occur.  As such, they tended to lean toward the worst case rather than the best case scenario when analyzing events.  Iraq was no exception.  Though Bush administration officials had mentioned the possibility of regime change in Iraq even before September 2001, the campaign to remove Hussein gained considerable prominence following the attacks.  We need to remember at this point that many of the Bush administration's top leaders truly believed Iraq had WMDs and thought Hussein's murderous regime should end.  Paul Wolfowitz was likely the strongest voice of all in favor of the Iraq war.  He often compared the previous policy of containment to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler before the Second World War.  Many others in the administration and the Intelligence Community were less convinced, but believed someone had the critical information they lacked (classified information is extremely compartmentalized, meaning no one person gets to see all of the facts).

Paul Wolfowitz, main proponent of invading Iraq

So all of this helps explain why Iraq's alleged WMDs were of concern, but it doesn't address the ideological reasons behind the invasion.  George W. Bush and most of his senior administration staff were strong supporters of the Neoconservative ideology of American foreign policy.  Among other things, this ideology believes that a show of American strength would intimidate other adversaries into submission and that American interests would prevail simply because they are (in their view) more morally superior (known as "right makes might").  Finally, Bush's particular brand of neoconservatism though that, since democracy is inherently superior to other forms of government, that a democratic Iraq would lead to successful democratic revolutions all over the region (like magic!).  To refute all of these ideas would take much more than a simple blog post, but suffice to say that the failures of neconservatism in the Iraq war have (thankfully) eroded much of the support for these ideas.

One other ideology which gained prominence during the Bush administration was that of preemptive warfare.  Preemptive warfare is the idea of attacking a potentially threatening country before it has the chance to attack you in return.  Unlike wars of retaliation or defense, this type of action assumes aggression from the other nation.  The obvious problem with this logic is that it presumes to know exactly what the other nation is intending to do and then justifies warfare in response.  Sometimes these presumptions are incorrect, leading to military conflicts based on a factually inaccurate basis.  When combined with the lack of reliable intelligence in early 2000s Iraq and the administration's tendency towards assuming the worst of Hussein, it is clear how this type of foreign policy thinking can lead to serious problems.

Maybe this guy should have been consulted too...

With the administration convinced, it was time to get Congress, the American public, and the international community on board as well.  Even now it is very difficult to separate the incorrect (but factually supported) assumptions from the exaggerated reports and from the outright false claims that were made in the lead up to the invasion. However, assertions like Hussein's ties to Al-Qaeda and Iraq's alleged possession of unknown stockpiles of uranium had almost no credible intelligence to back them up.  There were certainly good reasons to remove Hussein from power, but these were not among them.  Naturally, the American public was relatively easy to persuade in the post-September 11th atmosphere.   In the international community, the United Kingdom and Australia were the only nations pledge significant support for the invasion. But it didn't really matter.  By then, war was all but inevitable.

Colin Powell advocating for war at the United Nations

In all, there is no doubt that Hussein was a brutal leader of a dictatorial regime.  Iraq deserved a better leader and a more just form of government.  Ultimately, the people who pushed for this change aren't evil (except maybe Cheney).  They truly believed that what they were doing was the right course of action and would result in positive benefits for nearly all Iraqis.  However, such blind idealism can be extremely dangerous in the realities of policy and war. 

Even as the statue of Saddam was torn down in the central plaza of Baghdad and President Bush declared victory, the situation in Iraq could still have been salvaged.  With better planning, preparation, and execution of the war effort, many of the problems which emerged during the occupation could have been avoided.  These failures of the execution of the war strategy (and the lack of a meaningful exit plan) will be the topic of part two in this series.  

TL;DR: The war in Iraq was started not because of oil or revenge, but because of an ideology that favored strong military action instead of diplomacy, and an administration that assumed the worst of Iraq's intentions.

*A significant portion of the opinions and interpretations from this post are the result of the work of Thomas Ricks in his critical work Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq.  Go read it!

Are There Benefits To America's Perpetual War Machine?

"Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of ploughshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions." -President Dwight Eisenhower

Dwight Eisenhower, seen here looking presidential

When President Eisenhower warned of the dangers of the Military-Industrial Complex during his farewell address to the nation in 1961, he spoke of the dangers it could pose to American democracy and the freedom of the world.  Over fifty years later, the MIC has been firmly entrenched in American politics and its impacts are felt every day.  The United States spends around 600 billion dollars on defense every year (this is more than the next seven nations combined).  This may seem like a massive waste of money at first glance, but can it be justified in any way?  This week, let's examine the role of the MIC and any benefits it might provide to national and global stability.

First of all, what is the Military Industrial Complex anyway?  Essentially, it is the system of military defense contractors (weapons and technology producers) in the United States and the funding these companies receive from the United States government.  The billions in funding for defense programs has led to the long-term creation of an entire manufacturing industry of this technology.  This funding also provides millions of dollars in grants to college and private research facilities.  Since all of these employ hundreds of thousands of people, the MIC has created a system whereby the nation and its economy are in many ways dependent upon the weapons and technology of war (the U.S. isn't unique in this regard, most developed nations have some form of this). Since removing this system would drastically impact the nation's security and economy, it is essentially self-sustaining.

That's a lot of money!

There are certainly downsides to this system (it tends to create an incentive to use these weapons), but there is a reason why so much money is spent.   Since fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the United States has assumed the mantle of being the only world superpower (hegemon), and shared dual superpower status with the Soviet for forty-five years before that.  The U.S. essentially acts as the world's police force in the absence of any other strong power to challenge it.  Like it or not, when a disaster happens somewhere in the world, most everyone looks to America first to see what it plans to do.  The United States Navy is especially important in that regard since no other nation even comes close to the American navy in terms of its dominance of the seas.

There are numerous advantages of this hegemony to both America and the world (at least to those nations that are not outright hostile to the U.S.).  The American Navy in particular acts as a way to project American influence and interests nearly anywhere in the world.  It can help promote free trade on the seas, encourage safe sea travel, and respond to humanitarian crises almost immediately.  Since large armies and navies are extremely expensive, the presence of an allied American military allows other closely allied nations (like those in Europe) to spend far more on social programs than on their own defense (since they know they can call on the American military for support if they ever needed it).  The presence of a clearly defined dominant power also discourages the creation of competing alliance systems and lowers the likelihood of large-scale war breaking out across the world.  To put it in perspective, both of last century's world wars were started in part because of competing alliance systems.  And by outsourcing much of their military power to the U.S., it helps prevent a large scale build-up of armies which could eventually begin challenging each other. 

These things aren't cheap

So how does the Military-Industrial Complex actually benefit society in general?  As mentioned earlier, it creates at least one million jobs among defense contractors, military research agencies, and the Department of Defense.  It has also been responsible for some of the modern era's most important civilian technology such as modern air travel, satellites, computers, and the Internet.   It is no secret that war produces some of the greatest innovation in human history (we are shockingly good at finding new ways to kill each other).  The Second World War in particular dramatically jumpstarted the U.S. economy and led to an unprecedented postwar boom in prosperity.  This isn't to say that war is necessary for technological developments to take off, but the preparation for war can actually be positive for global prosperity (so long as most of those weapons are never actually used).  Basically, the American MIC provides all of the benefits of this perpetual war machine without the drawbacks of actually waging large scale war on everyone.  Wars certainly still occur, but they their scale and lethality tend to be reduced from earlier conflicts.

Thanks for the Internet Al!

In order for the U.S. to maintain this position, it also spends a large part of its defense spending on staying ahead of other nations in terms of developing the latest technologies.  Typically, the U.S. wants to be a least one or two generations of development ahead of any current or future military power (this is why arms sold to other nations are usually far older and less capable than what we are currently developing).  Related to this is the concept of combat readiness.  Large amounts of money and materials are spent just to keep everyone trained for whatever may happen at any time (since any of America's allies could call for support when a crisis emerges).  In short, it takes a lot to keep the military ready for anything at a moment's notice.

All of this brings us to the ultimate point: being the clear hegemonic power (whether you like it or not) is expensive, but comes with a host of benefits.  When that power (for the most part) promotes the general welfare of people around the world (human rights and such) this isn't necessarily a bad thing.  The world is actually in its most peaceful period in human history (though this isn't only because of America of course) and is extremely stable even with the recent rise in tensions with Russia.  Granted, the downsides are that there are still a lot of weapons which end up being used, while others are sold or traded to allied nations which increases instability (America is, after all, the largest arms dealer in the world).  But the positives seem to outweigh the negatives in this case.

Always wanted to use this image

All of this isn't to say that there is no room to cut wasteful spending in the MIC.  Any system of manufacturing, research, and government as large and complex as America's defense industry will certainly have unnecessary projects.  Redirecting some of this funding towards other industries (information technology or healthcare for instance) could also be an extremely positive development, but eradicating the system altogether would be harmful to the nation's development and the stability of the world (since another power would just move right in and upset the balance of power).  Accomplishments such as the moon landing and the eradication of smallpox show just how capable humanity can be at solving its problems given enough money and willpower.  If some of the efforts of the MIC can be directed towards other noble causes (with less obvious military benefits), imagine what we can do.

TL;DR: The Military-Industrial Complex, while extremely expensive, is the inevitable result of America's dominant position in the global community.  It also creates a bunch of awesome technology for civilian use.