What Is The Link Between Mental Illness And Radicalization?

"Mental illness is nothing to be ashamed of, but stigma and bias shame us all." -Bill Clinton

Memorial service for the victims in Tennessee

Mass shootings appear to be in the news nearly all of the time these days.  Last month, a man entered the Emanuel AME church and opened fire on a Bible study group, killing nine people and sparking off a series of discussions on racially motivated violence.  Earlier this month, mass shootings occurred in both Louisiana and Tennessee.  In response to these events, people often blame firearms for either being too readily available or not available enough to stop these individuals.  However, the real issue behind these events is often far more complicated.  Though initial details are still sketchy, many reports suggest that the shooters in Louisiana and Tennessee both suffered from depression.  There is also considerable speculation that the Tennessee shooter had been motivated by radical religious beliefs of martyrdom.  All of this raises the question: Is there a connection between mental health and radicalization? 

Not exactly the real issue here

First of all, what is depression? Well it isn't just a fancy word for feeling "bummed out." The Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders lists long-term symptoms such as decreased interests in daily activities, impaired social function, and feelings of guilt of worthlessness.  There are many different types of depression and it can be brought on by any number of causes (both situational and because of chemical imbalances in the brain).  It is estimated that nearly 40 million Americans suffer from some form of depression or anxiety (often undiagnosed).  Treatments range from personal therapy to drugs which seek to re-stabilize the chemical balance within the brain.

Some basic facts, get educated!

So these shooters were potentially suffering from depression.  How likely is it that they turned to radical extremism because of this?  Most modern theories on terrorism and extremist ideologies do not attribute mental illness as a significant factor for adopting these beliefs.  Though it can play a part in a person's motivation to commit violent crimes, it is more often the violent act that brings about mental illness (not the other way around).  Instead, sociologists often link radicalization to isolated or alienated people with narcissistic personalities (though there is significant debate on this).

In both Tennessee and Louisiana, the shooters seemed to have some history of mental illness.  The Aurora theater shooting is yet another example of a person with potential mental illness engaging in mass violence. However, these cases seem to be the exception rather than the rule.  We certainly cannot make a reasonable case that people engaged in mass killings are completely sane, but blaming their heinous acts on a legitimate (and so often misunderstood) mental condition is often not entirely accurate.  Individuals suffering from mental health conditions are often searching for meaning or validation in their lives.  They can withdraw from social life as a coping mechanism, while others latch on to ideologies or support groups to help bury their feelings.  Depression and other mental illnesses often cause extreme self-hatred or feelings of worthlessness.  While it is possible that low self esteem and indifference to the world can cause individuals with severe depression to channel their sadness and negative emotions outward, most people suffering from depression take their feelings out on themselves. Rather than lash out at other people they instead lash out at themselves.

This probably isn't helping things either...

This isn't to say that there aren't some cases where people with mental illness adopt radical beliefs.  In those cases, radical Islam is just one of many things these people could turn to.  Some choose this, others choose racist ideologies, others just lash out at any target they see as responsible for their bad feelings through indiscriminate violence.  In the case of the Tennessee shooter, his upbringing may have made him more prone to choose radical Islam over other ideologies, but the same can be said about the South Carolina shooter and his upbringing.  Islam itself isn't necessarily more inherently violent than other ideologies, the radical voices just seem louder. 

If it turns out that ISIS and its warped interpretation of Islam are partially to blame for the Tennessee shooting, this tells us about the terror tactics they are attempting to use.  Al-Qaeda's tactics typically involved elaborate and theatrical schemes designed to shock people.  While effective (when executed successfully) at generating fear, they are often very difficult to pull off due to their complex nature (it's hard to hide bomb making equipment from the FBI).  ISIS, on the other hand, has taken a much different approach to terror.  They issue calls to all potential supporters to commit acts of violence wherever they have an opportunity (though very few attacks have been directly tied to this).  Sadly, one of the most effective and inexpensive methods of causing terror is to simply find a firearm and begin shooting up a public area.  This is extremely difficult to prevent and predict since a large majority of American citizens have access to these weapons and they can often be carried into a variety of public places (and neither banning guns or giving everyone access to weapons will solve this problem).  Using "lone wolf" gunmen may unfortunately prove more effective than other methods of terrorism since it is hard to predict and yet still effective in generating fear and making headlines.  It also has the added effect of continuing to fuel the seemingly unending debate about gun control in America.

 A lone wolf.  Though you are still more likely to die in a bathtub than by terrorist attack.

In all, people commit violent acts and turn to radical ideologies and groups for a wide variety of reasons (some are completely normal and sane minus the whole wanting to kill people part).  Though mental illness may not play as big of a role as most people think, it is still a significant problem which needs to be addressed.  Even though the link between mental illness and radicalization is weak, comprehensive and supportive mental health care will do far more to address the root of this problem than banning weapons or giving everyone a gun.  This certainly won't solve the issue or stop all mass shootings, but if it prevents even one act of mass violence, it will have been worth it.

Fortunately, mental health awareness is finally starting to gain meaningful recognition in popular culture (though conditions such as anxiety, depression, and psychosis are still heavily stigmatized).  Despite laws preventing insurance discrimination of mental health treatment, insurance companies often find ways to shortchange people on their mental health coverage.  Until we treat mental health problems like we do physical health problems, millions will continue to suffer with untreated or undiagnosed conditions.  Depression isn't just a matter of "stop being sad and be happy instead."  And you can't just "get over" mental health problems by ignoring them in the hopes they go away.  Real progress and healing requires real solutions. 

TL;DR: Depression and mental illness doesn't contribute to radicalization nearly as much as it seems, but these are still serious problems which need to be address by the American public.

*I have refrained from using the names or images of any of the convicted shooters in this article.  This is a deliberate attempt to not give them any of the recognition or acknowledgement they desire.* 

The Great Sunni-Shia Divide In Yemen

The Recent Situation In Yemen

For several months now, a civil war has been raging in the impoverished nation of Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula.  While tensions in the region have simmered for decades, this most recent conflict broke out when a group of Shia rebels known as the Houthis overthrew the Sunni elected president of Yemen Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi earlier this year.  They also took control of most of Yemen's port city of Aden.  Now, nearly seven million of Yemen's people are facing a famine crisis.  Though the United Nations recently took advantage of a temporary ceasefire to deliver food and supplies to the civilian population, more suffering will surely follow until this power struggle is resolved.  So nearly half a year after the outbreak of this conflict, where do things currently stand?

The Houthis have been driven out of most of their strongholds within Aden and are being pushed back into the countryside of Yemen.  With Saudi Arabia leading airstrikes on Houthi safehouses, Sunni tribal leaders engaged in ground combat, and a large Saudi Arabian army amassed at the border with Yemen, it appears the Houthi's days in charge of Aden (and much of its remaining territory) are numbered.  It should be noted that the Houthis never controlled Yemen outright even after overthrowing President Hadi's government.  Yemen's political makeup has a strong emphasis on regional alliances and local officials, so overthrowing a president doesn't exactly guarantee control over the entire country.  Many have compared this current civil war to the much longer divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims throughout the world.   This is a vast oversimplification and greatly overemphasizes the role of nations like Saudi Arabia and Iran in determining local politics.  Still, the Sunni-Shia divide plays a big part of this conflict.  Let's examine the (very oversimplified) basics of this division in Islam and what it means.

Sunni and Shia Populations in the Middle East

Following the death of Islam's prophet Muhammad, a new leader (Caliph) of the Muslim community needed to be appointed.  One group, who would later become the Sunni (from the Arabic "Sunna" meaning the sayings and actions of Muhammad) believed that a man named Abu Bakr should lead the community since he was likely the closest companion to Muhammad.  However, some people (who would later become know as the Shia meaning followers of Ali) disagreed, believing that only a member of the prophet's family could rightly hold the title.  They wanted to see a man named Ali ibn Abi Talib become Caliph instead (Ali was Muhammad's first cousin and married Muhammad's daughter Fatima).  Though they got their wish a few decades later when the Caliph Uthman ibn Affan was assassinated, the struggle of trying to make a member of Muhammad's family the leader of the Islamic community caused these factions to drift further apart and ultimately break out in civil war (known as the Fitna).

Since then, many Sunnis have generally recognized (or at least acknowledged) a long series of Caliphs.  These were usually the leaders of whichever conquering army was in control of the region at the time (Umayyad rulers, then the Abbasid rulers, then the Ottoman sultans).  The position of Caliph disappeared entirely when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk abolished the office in Turkey after declaring Turkish independence from the Ottomans.  No widely recognized leader has taken up the position since then (though Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS has tried to claim this title).

Saudi Arabian Troops in Formation

The Shia, on the other hand, began recognizing a series of Imams (like an Islamic priest) as their spiritual leaders.  Most Shia recognize twelve Imams as being divinely appointed (the twelfth Imam supposedly went into hiding centuries ago and will return as a savior of humanity), though some only recognize the first five or seven of these as divinely inspired.  This may seem like a minor division between Sunni and Shia, but centuries of violence between some in these factions has caused distrust and fueled revenge attacks in a long cycle of conflict.  With nations like Iran being predominantly Shia and the Arabian Gulf nations being predominantly Sunni, ethnicity and nationalism can also play a part in this mistrust.  However, we shouldn't imagine that all Sunni and Shia do not like each other.  These are only broad trends and the majority of average Muslims are not quite as concerned about these religious differences as media sources would like people to believe.  The divide has existed for well over a thousand years, but this does not mean Sunnis and Shias have been embroiled in perpetual conflict for the entire time.

So can the two live peacefully together?  Yes, under the right circumstances.  In places like Lebanon, the Sunni and Shia populations (along with some Christian minorities) have worked out a power sharing plan within the government to ensure each group has a say in the political process.  In places where Muslims are not the majority, Sunni and Shia populations often have to join together to advocate for their common rights and religious freedoms in the face of discrimination.  The main contributor to positive Sunni-Shia relations appears to be a more representative system where one faction does not have complete and perpetual dominance over the other.  However, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and ISIS all encouraging Sunni-Shia conflict, it is very unlikely a genuine peace will emerge anytime soon.   

Lebanon's Religious Factions

What does this divide mean for Yemen's current conflict?  Assuming the Houthis are eventually defeated (or at least pushed back into the fringe of Yemeni politics), the country will likely remain a close ally to both the United States and Saudi Arabia.  Iran would also see its spreading influence blocked in Yemen (though it is important to recognize again that the Houthis are their own independent actors and not just puppets of the Iranians).  Unfortunately, this conflict has allowed AQAP to spread and take advantage of the chaos of the conflict to recruit more members.  Though the terrorist group has very limited ability to conduct attacks outside of its small regional area, it will continue to gain strength the longer this conflict drags on.

No matter the outcome of this civil war, Yemen's sectarian problems will never be resolved without the economic, educational, and infrastructural changes which it desperately needs.  These reforms alone will not solve all of Yemen's problems, but an educated and productive population is far less likely to become mired in the patters of cyclical violence which often plague poor regions with divided societies.  The "great Sunni-Shia divide" is not an impossible gulf to bridge.  With time and enough positive investment, even these long-competing groups can learn to coexist (or at least tolerate one another).

TL;DR: The Sunni and Shia have (on a broad scale) opposed each other for many centuries, but that is no reason to abandon all hope of a great Islamic coexistence.

What Are The Alternatives To An Iranian Nuclear Deal?

"I hope - and indeed I believe - that this agreement will lead to greater mutual understanding and cooperation on the many serious security challenges in the Middle East."- Ban Ki Moon, United Nations Secretary General

Lead negotiators after finalizing the Iran nuclear agreement

Negotiations on Iran's nuclear development program have been going on for over a decade.  This week, a critical milestone in those negotiations was reached as the United States (along with the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germany) and Iran formally agreed to the terms of a final deal limiting its development of nuclear technology.   If you recall, President Obama agreed to let Congress review the deal prior to it going into effect.  They can now issue a nonbinding (symbolic) rejection of the deal, but Obama can still override their decision if they do not have a 2/3rds majority.  This makes it nearly certain that the deal will be implemented.

As we have discussed previously, Iran has been allegedly attempting to gain access to a nuclear weapon for several years (they have never outright admitted it, but they often conceal information about their program and enrich uranium to levels which suggest weapons development).  Though more outlandish theories attribute this to a desire for regional military conquest or the destruction of the State of Israel, the main reason most nations seek nuclear weapons is for regime security and military defensive superiority.  With these types of weapons, other states are highly unlikely to invade or launch military attacks against them.

Nations with nuclear weapons

To put it simply, Iran needs uranium to build a nuclear weapon.  Uranium can also be used for energy and medical treatments, so it's not like uranium can be banned entirely in Iran.  Uranium needs to be enriched (purified) from its raw form which comes out of rocks in the ground.  Most medical and energy purposes only need uranium to be enriched to no more than 5% (100% being completely pure).  Iran has agreed to seriously cutback on its enrichment of uranium and plutonium (both very rare and difficult to produce in quantities sufficient to make a weapon) in exchange for the removal of sanctions (trade restrictions on almost everything going into or out of Iran).  The country will also have to allow inspectors into its facilities at any time to ensure they are keeping their end of the deal.

Worldwide uranium deposits

The deal has some wins for Iran (small amounts of continued enrichment for up to fifteen years, operation of some facilities, and the lifting of sanctions), and some wins for the U.S. and its partners (enrichment is limited to 3.7% and all facilities must give full access to inspectors).  To ensure the continued cooperation of both sides, Iran still maintains some ability to enrich uranium and the U.S. can still reimpose sanctions if it feels like Iran is not living up to its end of the bargain.  This balance helps keep both sides honest while the deal is in place.  It is important to remember that Iran doesn't really consider America to be a shining example of honesty and integrity in international affairs (the CIA overthrew their elected prime minister a while ago).  Iran distrusts America about as much as America distrusts Iran. Because of this, both sides need to feel they have some ability to re-escalate the situation if needed (otherwise no deal would ever be agreed to in the first place).

Former Prime Minister of Iran Mohammad Mossadegh

Many critics point to the continued enrichment of uranium or the maintenance of some facilities as signs of a terrible deal.  To these opponents, any deal which does not entirely remove Iran's enrichment ability and nuclear research facilities is unacceptable.  However, it is critical to point out that such a deal is equally unacceptable to the Iranians.  They would never accept a deal like that because it amounts to complete capitulation to the American demands.  (The real reason for most of the American, Israeli, and Arab Gulf opposition is because the lifting of sanctions will eventually strengthen and empower Iran.)  Since the U.S. and its allies could theoretically reimpose sanctions at any time without serious repercussions,  Iran would lose all of its bargaining power to have sanctions lifted again in the future if it removed all ability to push back using uranium enrichment.  In short, agreements are about compromise, not capitulation.

Furthermore, if the complete removal of Iran's enrichment and research abilities is the only measure of a successful deal, then what other alternatives are there when such a deal inevitably fails?  Short of imposing more sanctions (which is about as unlikely to work as continuing the sanctions has in ending the program), the only other option is military conflict.  Their facilities can be bombed and damaged (but not entirely destroyed), but this will only delay their progress and likely embolden the regime to push even more aggressively for a nuclear weapon.  In that scenario, the only means of truly ending the threat of a nuclear Iran is to remove the regime itself.  This is an incredibly dangerous and destructive option (one which ought to have been learned through the experience in Iraq).

Centrifuge used to enrich (purify) uranium

Even if this deal breaks down and Iran begins racing to develop a bomb, the military option is always available in stopping this.  As it currently stands, most estimates place Iran's "breakout time" (the time it would take Iran to have a working weapon if it decided to do so) at about three months (though Israel's own intelligence suggests it is much longer).  Most estimates place the breakout time under this recent deal at least a year.  With international inspectors and scientists constantly monitoring the nuclear sites, it is highly unlikely Iran could develop a weapon in secret (not to mention every American and European intelligence agency will be closely monitoring this newly available data).  It would also be a large red flag if Iran suddenly expelled all of the inspectors and scientists, much like Saddam did in Iraq in 2002.  Simply put, no other option presents the same reasonable promise of success as the current negotiated plan. 

How will the region react to this?  It all depends on the willingness of Iran to maintain its end of the deal.  If Iran starts violating the terms of the agreement or starts acting shady about its program again, Saudi Arabia and other key players may begin planning for their own weapons program.  Though Saudi Arabia already has the preliminary makings of a nuclear program, the country is highly unlikely to actually develop it unless the threat of a nuclear Iran is imminent.  This is because the U.S. and its allies can put a lot more pressure on Saudi Arabia to stop a weapons program early in the process.  This would likely be done by cutting military arms deals, ending the import of Gulf oil, and cutting diplomatic support to Saudi Arabia.  Iran, often by its own actions towards the West, has already cut itself off from these options years ago. 

Saudi Arabia spends a lot of its money on military hardware

Whether successful or not, this deal is an historic change in the now decades long dispute over Iran's nuclear program.  What remains to be seen is whether both sides hold up their respective ends of the deal.  Opening up Iran to more trade options and outside influence might allow it to one day conduct shady arms deals with regional militant groups, but it can also increase the Iranian people's connections with the outside world.  When people are exposed to the ideas and interactions of the wider world, they tend to become less violent towards them.  This isn't to say that Iran's leadership will suddenly become friends with America and other Western powers, but Iran's people will have more positive exposure to these influences.  In the long term, this change in U.S.-Iranian relations can slowly help repair the damage done by decades of mistrust and subversion.  In all, lasting peace can only be achieved by mutual understanding, not mutual destruction.

TL; DR: The only real alternative to an Iranian nuclear deal is armed military intervention.  This deal helps prevent that.

What Is Russia Trying To Do In Eastern Europe?

This week's post comes to us from friend and colleague Brandon Kenney.  Brandon is a graduate of the University of Utah's Political Science program and is currently completing his Master's degree in Public Policy at the University of Minnesota.

Probably the best (fake) picture of Putin on the Internet

Not long ago, Washington’s foreign affairs experts were not overly concerned with Russia challenging the United States on a global stage.  Even along the campaign trail, Mitt Romney was laughed at in 2012 for making the claim that Russia was our top geopolitical adversary.  This is up for debate, but we certainly shouldn’t have been laughing about the matter three years ago.  Since then, Russia has grown in global influence, most notably with the annexation of Crimea. Tensions have only increased, with fears that Russia may pose a threat to the Baltic region (the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).  Last week, the United States announced it would be sending military hardware to seven European nations including the three Baltic countries.  Though it may not seem like a big deal, this is a somewhat serious buildup of weapons along an increasingly tense border.  So why is this (supposedly) a big deal?

Let’s take a step back, and look at what events lead to this point. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Soviet Union broke up, and regional powers began jockeying for influence over its remains. The most important powers that remained were the newly created Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  NATO had been founded as a military alliance between the United States and its closest European powers during the height of the Cold War.  Facing this newly empowered international organization, the Russian Federation after 1991 continued to lose influence in the region.  NATO incorporated Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, and the Baltic nations in 2004.  Though not exactly a model of success, the state of things in Russia has improved to the point that the country became richer and more powerful as the years passed. Vladimir Putin, coming to power in 2000, has centralized power and overseen the promotion of a fierce Russian nationalism. Itching to regain regional power, Putin has often stirred up problems in areas of lesser concern to western powers, such as Georgia (the country not the state). 

The expansion of NATO over the century

Putin has been even more aggressive lately, often acting under the pretense of an increasingly anxious Russian Diaspora living within the remains of the former USSR. Ukraine, the largest and most important of states (aside from Russia) in the former USSR, has often been one of the primary players in the East-West struggle. Following years of working toward a Western shift through a deal with the European Union, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych enraged pro-Western Ukrainians by cancelling the deal to shift its relations in favor of Russia. This led to protests throughout Ukraine in 2013, known as the Euromaidan protests. Two months later, in February 2014, Russian soldiers moved into the region known as Crimea and seized a number of government buildings. Days later, the Crimean parliament voted to join Russia, and called for a regional referendum. The vote, highly disputed, reported that 97% of Crimeans wanted to join Russia.  Initially, world leaders condemned the referendum and accused Russia of manipulating the region’s population. Since then, the world’s leaders have been mostly quiet; seeming to have accepted whatever took place early in 2014.

Protests in Ukraine's Maidan Square 2013

Though the world seems mostly resigned to Crimea’s fate, a proxy war continues to rage in Eastern Ukraine with pro-cessionist forces battling the Ukrainian army for control.  Russia continues to claim it has no part in this battle, but known Russian soldiers with Russian military equipment have been seen throughout the region (even taking selfies of themselves clearly in Ukraine).  Putin’s strategy seems to be one of a slow encroachment into Ukrainian territory, often gaining ground and then quickly calling ceasefires to buy the pro-cession forces time to fortify their new territory.  This region is especially important given the large number of natural gas pipelines which run through Ukraine, powering much of Western Europe.   

The military situation in Eastern Ukraine

In the meantime, eyes are turning toward Estonia, and some fear we may be headed toward a large scale conflict with Russia. These fears are not misguided. Estonia, much like Ukraine, was a part of the former USSR and has a large Russian minority. Russian official have spoken of concerns that the Russian minority has been mistreated.  The reincorporation of the Baltic States would also connect the mainland with its port at Kaliningrad and provide Russia with a much stronger presence in the Baltic sea.  

 Signaling that both sides do indeed fear escalation, Russia and NATO forces have carried out military exercises in the region.  As Estonia is a member of NATO, its allies would be required to intervene should Russia make any moves into any of the NATO allied states (part of Article Five of the NATO Charter). Just as it did in Ukraine, Russia may be looking to stir the pot in Estonia, and foment protests like those that took place in Ukraine. If successful, NATO would be forced to seriously consider stepping in. The organization’s hands are bound in a way they were not with Ukraine (since Ukraine is not a NATO member). The worst-case-scenario, then, seems to be an all-out war between Russia and NATO.

The Baltics: Russia's ticket to the North Sea

Despite all of this, I seriously doubt that anyone wants a war. The costs are far too high for both sides, especially Russia. If it is in Putin’s designs to annex Estonia as he did Crimea, he is probably counting on NATO being unwilling to get involved in a country like Estonia, just as they have stayed out of Ukraine. NATO’s inaction would lead to the end of the treaty, bolstering Russian’s power both in the region and further afield.  It is a dangerous game, but one which has the potential to either strengthen Russia’s regional hand significantly, or bring it spiraling back into the darkness of its early post-Cold War years.  Given the humiliation of these years and the loss of so many of its former Soviet satellites to NATO, it is understandable that Russia is looking to regain some of its former glory on the world stage.  Unfortunately, this could come at a very high price to both Russia and the world.

TL;DR: Russia is looking to challenge Western influence in Europe by testing the NATO alliance.  If Russia invades a NATO country, the U.S. will have to respond or risk losing the entire alliance.

Tactics and Tragedy in Last Summer's Gaza War

“For if life had taught her anything, it was that healing and peace can begin only with acknowledgment of wrongs committed.” ― Susan Abulhawa, Mornings in Jenin

The Gaza Strip and West Bank

Many people believe the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a centuries-old problem where the same two sides have been killing each other side the dawn of civilization.  Some depict Israel as a murderous regime while others believe the same of the Palestinians.  The reality is far more complicated than this.  The United Nations on Monday released a report which accuses both Israel and Hamas (one faction of Palestinians mostly located in the Gaza strip) of war crimes from last summer's outbreak of violence.  With the one year anniversary of this war coming up in July, let's take a closer look at this event and some of the (often tragic) tactics used by both sides in this conflict.

The complete history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is much too long to detail here (and trying to shorten it into a few paragraphs just doesn't do it justice).  The modern roots of the 2014 Gaza war come from the split between the Palestinian Authority (recognized by Israel in the 1993 Oslo Accords as the representative government of the Palestinians) and Hamas (a much more radical political party which opposed the Accords) in 2006.  In short, Hamas won an election over the PA, a serious battle ensued between the PA and Hamas, and Hamas ended up taking control of Gaza while the PA remained the primary governmental power in the West Bank. Since 2006, Hamas and Israel have occasionally launched rockets and bombs at each other (while the West Bank has remained mostly nonviolent in its disagreements with Israel).

Gaza Strip and the Israeli Blockade

So what kicked off last summer's war?  On July 7th, several senior Hamas leaders died in an underground tunnel explosion (Hamas often uses tunnels to smuggle weapons and militants into Israel).  Hamas claims that this was the result of an Israeli airstrike while Israel claims it was an accidental explosion of their own weapons.  The next day, Hamas launched rockets into Israel, Israel responded with attacks of its own, and the whole situation escalated into one of the worst periods of violence in recent years.  Both sides claimed their justifications, and both sides committed some terrible acts in the process. 

One of the primary tactics of Hamas has been their use of rocket attacks against targets in Israel.  These rockets have relatively low precision compared to most modern rockets, so Hamas militants mostly point them in the general direction of a city or military base with the intent to hit whatever they can.  The main point of this tactic is to terrorize the Israeli population in the hopes this will convince them to pressure the government into giving in to Hamas' demands.  Fortunately, the "Iron Dome" missile defense system ensures that the vast majority of rockets do not hit any major cities (part of the reason Israeli casualties were so low in this conflict).  Hamas is also well known for using people's homes, hospitals, and other key infrastructure points to house weapons and their own fighters (making it difficult to attack them without creating civilian casualties).  In all, Israel lost 64 fighters and 6 civilians during the conflict.

Israel's Iron Dome Missile Defense System

On the Israeli side, the IDF (Israel Defense Force) used a combination of precision rocket strikes and armored vehicles to attack Hamas positions.  Unfortunately, as mentioned above, most of these positions are either key infrastructure points for Gaza City or civilian homes. Israel's military technology is very advanced (to the point where they can pinpoint an exact house to strike from the air).  Unlike Hamas, Israel knows exactly what it is hitting when it launches an attack.  For most civilian homes, the IDF claims to fire warning shots at homes and send phone calls as they are about to be hit (the warning shots are actually a small missile which has been altered so it doesn't explode).  This still only gives civilians at most a few minutes to evacuate their homes or die.  After the warning shot, the building is quickly leveled, destroying whatever military target (alleged or otherwise) was inside, but killing or displacing civilians in the process.  This is part of the reason Gaza City lost a hospital and power plant during this conflict. 

Though the IDF is correct in its assertion that Hamas uses these locations to house weapons and fighters, this does not make them legitimate targets by most international standards.  Just because a hospital is being used as an enemy base doesn't mean you should blow it up (for context, the U.S. military Rules of Engagement specifically prohibit attacking these sites unless absolutely necessary).  In all, Hamas lost an estimated 750 fighters and roughly 1,500 Palestinian civilians were killed during the conflict (not to mention over a quarter of a million people were displaced according to the United Nations).  Certainly, some of these civilians may have been combatants or could have been killed by Hamas instead, but this figure is still staggeringly high.  Furthermore, this mentality of "shoot the hostage to kill the enemy" is a poor way to conduct what is, in reality, an insurgency rather than a conventional war.

Casualty Figures in the 2014 War

On August 26th, a cease-fire finally took hold between Hamas and Israel.  So where is the conflict one year later?  Is any real peace possible? Not in the foreseeable future.  Israel and the Palestinian Authority continue to disagree on the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank (the process by which Israel builds houses in the West Bank and allows its citizens to live on this land, often displacing Palestinian civilians in the process).  Israel and Hamas remain in an unsteady cease-fire (which could flare up again at any time).  Finally, the PA has little power in Gaza and any final peace treaty would need both the West Bank and Gaza behind it (Israel has already stated it will not negotiate with Hamas on this).  Though international opinion is starting to turn in favor of the moderate (nonviolent) Palestinian factions, any true peace is still a long way away.

Settlements in the West Bank

Just to be clear, this isn't one of those posts which claims that both sides are equally guilty and at fault in this war.  Both sides are guilty of egregious crimes for sure, but one side is exponentially more powerful and capable than the other. Israel is a stable, (mostly) democratic country with a very strong military and some of the most advanced hardware in the world (courtesy of the U.S.).  It boasts a GDP of 268 billion and an average per capita GDP of around $36,000.  Gaza, on the other hand, is a severely impoverished region (GDP per capita of $6,100) with a barely functioning government ruled mostly by armed militants.  Their weapons consist primarily of whatever scraps they manage to find from Syria, China, and Russia, along with the limited number of outdated rockets which are smuggled in through the Egyptian border.  If any side truly has the means to bring about meaningful change in this conflict it is Israel.   The Palestinians in Gaza can barely keep the lights on and clean water flowing, so expecting them to have any real negotiating power is simply unrealistic.

If this analysis seems a little one-sided, its because that is the reality of the situation on the ground.  While Israel emerged from this war almost completely unscathed, Gaza's infrastructure has once again been decimated and its population continues to spiral into desperation.  This isn't entirely Israel's fault by any stretch of the imagination (after all Hamas is legitimately a terrorist organization).  But the continued blockade of Gaza essentially means that the region's population is imprisoned with a large group of desperate militants who know they will likely be killed the moment they lose power.  Israel certainly has the right to defend itself, but Israel also has the capacity and capability to be part of the solution.  Granted, the costs to Israel and risks associated with something like a broad humanitarian relief effort are high, but so is the moral cost of simply keeping Gaza contained in its own misery.  Then again, when the human and material costs of this conflict to Israel are so low, what incentive is there to solve the problem?

TL:DR: Both sides are guilty of serious crimes, but Israel is much more capable of changing the current situation.  A little restraint in the fight against Hamas can go a long way towards minimizing civilian deaths.

The Winners And Losers Of Turkey's Parliamentary Election

"The discussion of executive presidency and dictatorship have come to an end in Turkey with these elections." -HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas.

Turkey, the country not the bird

As one of the most stable countries in the Middle East, Turkey has long provided the region with an excellent example of how democracy and a weak executive branch can work in an otherwise highly fractured region.  Recently, Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan appeared to be challenging this tradition by making moves towards increasing the authorities of the presidential office.  Fortunately, Turkey's parliamentary elections earlier this week appear to have ended this dream (or at least dealt it a serious setback).  Let's take a look at the politics of Turkey and what this election means for the future of the country.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Unlike most other regional powers, Turkey does not have a strong authoritarian leader (something Erdogan is supposedly trying to change).  However, Turkey (with the notable exception of the Kurdish minority) does have a much stronger sense of shared nationalism, religious identity, and culture than most other Middle East nations (like Iraq for instance).  The modern state of Turkey was founded mostly by Mustafa Kemal just after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.  Kemal believed strongly in making the new nation appear more "Western."  Among other things, he is famous for establishing a secular parliamentary government, abolishing the Islamic office of the Caliph, and introducing a Latin-based script to the Turkish language (he also banned the Fez for not being "European enough").  Turkey has remained relatively stable throughout the decades and is not as vulnerable to the same ethnic/religious breakdowns we have seen in other nations.  Today, the office of President has few significant powers (this is mostly vested in the Parliament).

Mustafa Kemal (Called the Father of the Turks)

So who is Erdogan and what was he trying to do?  Erdogan founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001, which has since become the dominant party in Parliament.  He assumed the role of Prime Minister in 2003 and President in 2014, and started a process of encouraging infrastructure and educational investment (doubling the number of universities and drastically increasing the education budget). However, his presidency has also been marred by corruption scandals, media intimidation, and attempts to return Turkey to a more religiously-centered nation.  It seems his plan for the recent elections was for the AKP to win enough parliamentary seats to change Turkey's constitution without a holding a national referendum.  If this would have happened, Erdogan's party could easily have granted significant powers to the presidential office through constitutional changes.

He also built this giant presidential palace on federal land

But Erdogan's plan was foiled in this week's election.  His party only won 40% of the seats in Parliament (still more than any other party, but not enough to form a government on their own).  Under the Turkish constitution, the various political parties need to join together to form a majority government every election cycle.  Now, the AKP will need to combine forces with another party to form a ruling coalition (none of which are likely to help Erdogan amend the constitution).  If a new coalition isn't formed in the next several weeks, there will be a re-election to go through the process all over again.  This setback by the AKP is being recognized as a clear indication of the public's disapproval of many of Erdogan's actions (though many still support his reform programs).  Most likely, the AKP will relax its reform-minded agenda in favor of one which is more inclusive to other parties. 


If the AKP was the big loser in this election, the primary Kurdish party (People's Democratic Party or HDP) was the big winner.  The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group whose lands were split among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria following the First World War.  Since then, the Kurds have never attained real independence in any of these states (they have also split into several distinct factions, making a unified Kurdistan nearly impossible).  This party, which pushes a more left-leaning and pro-Kurdish agenda, attained the 10% of overall votes needed to hold seats in Parliament.  This party has reached across cultural divides to gain both Kurdish and Turkish votes alike.  Their dramatic inclusion into the Turkish Parliament will likely mean more rights and autonomy for the Kurdish people (and a growing check on Erdogan's power).

A quick breakdown of the election results

So what does all of this mean for the region?  Well it certainly seems like the Kurds will play a much bigger role in Turkish politics (likely giving themselves greater independence).  Without his party's super-majority, Erdogan will be unable to increase his own power significantly, but he will still heavily influence things like Turkey's European Union bid and the fight against ISIS in neighboring Syria.  After all, the AKP is still by far the dominant party in Turkish politics. 

In all, this election seems to be a big win for the forces of democratic governance in Turkey.  In an era where Middle East nations are increasingly becoming more authoritarian (Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf nations), the defeat of Erdogan's potential power grab is a welcome reminder that popular rule can still succeed.  Some nations need a strong executive leader to function, others only a need broad ruling coalition.  Turkey, it seems, has opted for the latter. 

TL;DR: Minority parties win big in Turkish elections, President Erdogan loses his chance to increase his own power.

Hijabis Need Not Apply

"Discrimination has a lot of layers that make it tough for minorities to get a leg up." - Bill Gates

The inspiration for this post title, if you didn't already get it

Religious discrimination comes in many forms.  Sometimes it is as obvious a bunch of armed protesters outside a mosque in Arizona.  But more often than not, discrimination is subtle and much harder to fight against.  Workplace discrimination is no exception.  Affirmative Action and other such programs have attempted to correct this inequality, but often with mixed and controversial results.  In one recent case of workplace discrimination, Samantha Elauf, a Muslim woman who regularly wears a hijab, was denied a position at Abercrombie and Fitch because of her religious apparel.  On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Elauf, citing that A&F violated her individual religious freedom by penalizing her application because of her clothing.

What justification did A&F presume to have for denying Elauf a job?  She had applied for a position as a "model" (the people who wear Abercrombie's preppy clothes and drown you in cologne) when she was 17.  As part of their "Look Policy," the company typically doesn't hire people who wear "inappropriate" clothing (such as hats or unfashionable items).  It isn't so much that they are outright rejected, but their applications are usually demoted in favor of those who more closely resemble the A&F style.  This isn't the first case of discrimination in the Look Policy either.  In Elauf's case, her interviewer specifically stated that she was rejected because she wore a hijab.  (Check out a previous post for more about the importance of wearing hijabs and other apparel in the Islamic faith.)

Samantha Elauf and her mother Majda

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminating based upon religious reasons (though people often have to specifically request this protection).  This is where policies such as the A&F Look Policy can often run into trouble. This policy in general makes some sense in a clothing store (A&F needs to promote the brand after all), but these policies can sometimes encourage judgements based upon cultural characteristics.  Making sure someone "looks appropriate" is an extremely subjective criteria (one which encourages hiring attractive, successful looking people with less regard to actual performance ability).

In the case of A&F, the main point of contention was whether or not Elauf should have stated she needed a religious exemption from the Look Policy.  As the court ruled, its pretty obvious Elauf would have needed an exemption for wearing a hijab (women wearing a hijab tend to identify as Muslim after all).  Now this doesn't mean that anyone wearing religious clothing can request an exemption.  After all, a women in a full body niqab probably wouldn't be granted this exemption since wearing A&F clothes is part of the job description.  Instead, other meaningful options for similar employment must be provided.  This is why such cases are so often difficult to mediate. 

The nine justices of the Supreme Court

In Monday's case, most of the justices decided in favor of Elauf, with only Justice Samuel Alito ruling against her.  Their arguments speak to the debate over company vs personal freedom in the workplace.  Most people would agree that a company can't decide to reject a job applicant just because they are black, gay, or republican (though many still do).  But discriminating against someone's weight, attractiveness, or religious appearance is still a very real possibility with policies such as this.  Unfortunately, Elauf's case is still not over (it gets pushed back to the appeals court who will make the final decision on her compensation).  At least for now, the case helps build the precedent against similar religious discrimination cases (A&F has also made changes to its Look Policy in recent years).

Overall, things like the Look Policy speak to a greater dynamic of maintaining a misguided definition of American dress and culture.  It isn't that Muslims (or anyone who does not fit the norm of "American" culture) aren't allowed to work for A&F, they just can't express their religious individuality in a meaningful way.  Like society in general, you can be different (or Muslim) all you want on the inside, just don't show it.

TL;DR: Abercrombie's "Look Policy" streamlines the process of rejecting people just for being different.